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D. H. WHITTENBURG, Chair-
man; H. J. CORLEISSEN and 
LAYTON MAXFIELD, Members 
of the Engineering Commission, 
Plaintiff an~d Respon,dent, 
vs. 
BURTON F. PEEK and CHARLES 
D. WIMAN, Trustees under the 
Will and of the Estate of 
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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
its ENGINEERING COMMISSION, 
D. H. WHITTENBURG, Chair-
man; H. J. CORLEISSEN and 
LAYTON MAxFIELD, Members 
of the Engineering Commission,_ 
Plaintiff an~d Respondent, 
vs. 
BURTON F. PEEK and CHARLES 
D. WIMAN, Trustees under the 
Will and of the Estate of 
CHARLES H. DEERE, Deceased, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 
?867 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF FACT·S 
On December 23, 1953, this court rendered an 
opinion and judgment granting appellants a new trial. 
Respondents hereby respectfully apply for a rehearing 
upon the grounds hereinafter set forth. 
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POINTS RELIED UPON 
This court erred: 
1. In holding that the trial court should have 
admitted evidence of the separate value of the water 
system located upon the land sought to be condemned. 
2. In holding that trial court erred in refus-
ing to admit evidence of the value of other property 
similar to that sought to be condemned. 
3. In holding that it was prejudicial error for 
the trial court to strike from appellant's answer certain 
allegations with reference to severance damages. 
We shall discuss these points in their order. 
ARGUMENT 
Evidence of Separate Value of Water System. 
The water right was appurtenant to the realty 
and the water system, consisting of storage tanks, 
conduits of the distributing system, water· hydrants, 
etc., were, of course, improvements. The ·Statute, 
Section 104-6-1 (Utah Code Annotated 1953, Sec. 
78-34-10) provides that the jury must ascertain and 
assess: 
''The value of the property condemned and 
all improvements thereon appertaining to the 
realty,'' etc. 
This Statute has been construe-d so many times 
by the courts that there ought to be no difference of 
opinion as to its meaning. In the following cases cited 
in respondent's brief, pages 31 and 3 2, it is held that 
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while improvements may be described in detail by the 
witnesses (as was done in this case), the value of im-
provements separate from thee realty may not be 
shown. Vallejo v. Home Savings Bank (Calif.) 140 
Pac. 974, Los Angeles v. Klinger (Calif.) 25 Pac. 2d 
826. In Shouder Creek Co. v. Harold (W. Va.) 45 
S.E. 2d 513, it is said: 
"To establish the value of land, the presence 
of crops, trees, shrubs and timber upon it, and of 
coal, oil, gas, stone and other minerals and valu-
able deposits upon or under the surface may be 
shown .... Consideration, however, should be 
confined to the land and its contents and elements, 
together and as an entirety when there is no sep-
arate ownership with respect to any of them .... 
Compensation for land should be ascertained and 
determined on the basis of its value at the time 
it is taken or damaged. All of its components 
may be considered in arriving at the value of the 
unit, the land itself, but none of them, when not 
separately owned may be given an independent 
value from the land as land.'' 
In Seattle, etc., Co. v. Roeder (Wash.) 70 Pac. 
498, the court in upholding an instruction by the trial 
judge uses this language: 
''If a piece of land taken contains valuable 
improvements, those improvements apart from 
the land may not be considered; yet certainly the 
character, nature and extent of the impro.vements 
and the revenue derived therefrom are as essntial 
to be considered in arriving at the value of the land 
as the land itself, or the uses to which it may be 
put." 
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None of the, authorities cited by respqndent, or 
a~ y others, are discussed or referred to in this court's 
opinion in .support of its holding: but the court dis-
poses of the matter in the following language: 
"Respondents objected to this evidence on 
the ground that there· was no showing that ap-
pellants had any water right, but the court ex-
cluded the proffered evidence without giving ap-
pellants an opportunity to make a showing of 
such ownership apparently on the ground that 
such evidence was not admissible even if such 
showing were made, Respondents' own wit-
nesses treated this as a valuable property right of 
appellants. It undoubtedly would have aided 
the jury in determining the true value of appel-
lants' property had all of these details ·been shown 
to them, for certainly they could more accurately 
assess the valuation of this property if they had 
before them the value which the experts placed 
on this system in arriving at their overall value 
of the property, and could test such valuation by 
comparison with the opinion of any expert on 
the value of that kind of property. The value 
of such a utility is especially one which calls for 
expert opinion because such property is not bought 
and sold every day on the open market, so expert 
opinion thereon is almost mandatory.'' 
While counsel for appellant did not include in 
the record before this court proof of ownership of the 
water right, they did offer proof thereof which was 
received; however, it is truet as stated by the court, 
that evidence of the value of the water right and water 
system separate and apart from the value of the land, 
was excluded. 
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If the above declaration of this court is to be 
the law of this State in eminent domain actions; of 
course, the decision must be followed, but the· conse ... 
quences of it, we feel, are not fully appreciated by the 
court for, according to .our construction of the ·court's 
language, it means that if a tract on which a home 
is located is condemned, the court must admit evi-
dence of the separate value of the house, of the sprink ... 
ling system, of the heating equipment, electric and gas 
conduits, orchard and shrubbery. They are improve-
ments just as the water system is an improvement. No 
real property, so far as we are advised, whereon im-
provements have been placed, is valued in any such 
fashion. A purchaser or an appraiser goes over the 
property, notes the character and structure of the build-
ings· thereon, their state of repair and ·what facilities 
are available for the· enjoyment of the property;· 
whether there is curb 'and gutter; and the condition 
of the premises generally~ and then makes a valua-
tion of the entire property as a unit, and that is the 
method which has been adopted in condemnation pro-
ceedings· in the states where the statute ·reads exactly· 
as does our statute.· Of course, ·it is the pre·rogative 
of this court to refuse to follow the construction placed 
by other courts on a statute identical with our own, 
but if the court determines to adhere to the ruling of 
which we complain, we must respectfully request that 
it make definite and certain its intention that each and 
all improvements on the condemned property shall 
have a separate value placed thereon. This definite-
ness is necessary to guide the court on the re-trial. 
If the water system is to be valued separately, we 
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ought to know whether the court intends that there 
shall be a separate valuation of the gas and electric dis-
tributing systems, the curb and gutter, and whether or 
not the constituent parts of the water system shall like-
wise be valued separately in order to arrive at the 
total value of said system. For example, the water 
system consists of two very large storage tanks; are 
they to be separately valued? The water right from 
the spring and the pipes and conduits which were 
designed to convey the water to the residential area, 
must they be separately valued? The trial court and 
the parties to this action ought to know whether 
there are any limitations as to the details of valua-
tion so that error will not be committed. We be-
lieve there can be no difference in principle with re-
spect to the valuation of land together with the im-
provements and the value of land with mineral de-
posits. Improvements are as much a part of the land 
as the mineral within it, and it is uniformly held that 
·where there is no separate ownership of the minerals 
apart from the land, minerals may not be separately 
valued. In the note to 156 A.L.R., page 1416, the 
authorities are collected in support of the following 
text: 
HWith remarkable unantmtty the courts 
hold that in determining the compensation in 
eminent domain proceedings for the land to be 
condemned, the existence of valuable mineral de-
posits in the land taken constitutes an element 
which may be take·n into consideration if and in-
sofar as it influences the market value of the land. 
The reason for this rule is that the measure of 
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compensation in eminent domain proceedings is 
the market value of the land to be condemned as 
a whole with due consideration of all the com-
ponents that make for its value. This rule has 
been expressed in a great number of decisions and 
has also been recognized by all the leading text-
writers on this subject. It has been applied in-
discriminately to all forms of mineral deposits, 
such as limestone, ore, gold, fire clay, coal, sand 
and gravel, and stone. 
''Occasionally the rule has been expressed by 
the negative statement that the award may not be 
reached by separately evaluating the land and the 
deposits, since the latter, being only one element 
among many in determining the market value of 
the land, cannot be considered as an independent 
factor the value of which is to be simply added 
to the value of the land.'' 
EVIDENCE OF VALUE OF SIMILAR LAND 
Here, again, in deciding that the value of similar 
land should have been received, this court has either 
disregarded, or rejected as unsoun,d in principle, the 
authorities cited in our Brief at pages 19-23. We think 
the court should reconsider this question. As stated 
in Watkins v. Railroad Co. (Iowa) 113 N.W. 924, 
925: 
"The practically universal rule is to the ef-
fect that such testimony is not admissible as sub-
stantive evidence of the value of the property 
which is the subject of the controversy." 
In that case, as here, the offer of such testimony 
was not intended simply to show the qualification of 
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the witness, .but was intended to adduce substantive 
evidence of the: value of the land to be condemned. 
In· Weber County v. Ritchie, 98 Utah 276, 96 
Pac. 2d 744, plaintiff offered evidence of what an-
other· land owner had received for his land for the 
same project. It appeared that the amount received 
was for value, plus segregation damage, and this court 
held that even if such had not been the case, it was 
questionable whether such evidence was proper under 
the definition of market value as applicable to con-
demnation proceedings, and in Telluride Power Co. 
v. Bruneau, 41, U tab 4, 125 Pac. 311, the court holds 
that it was not prejudicial error to 'exclude evidence 
of comparative values on direct exami~ation, such evi-
dence being admissible only on cross-examination to 
test the qualification of a witness who ·has testified to 
the value of the property sought to be condemned. In 
that case -a witness had testified to the value of the 
land. The following is from the court's opinion: 
0 ' • 
· ''Then, in response to further questions pro-
pounded to him on his direct examination he-fur-
ther stated· that he was acquainted with, sales of 
lands similar in character to the defendant's land, 
and that he had knowledge of the sale of a 
particular tract near the defendant's land, and that 
he obtained such information from the agent of 
the parties who had purchased the tract. There-
upon the court, on its own motion, observed: 
~'You are seeking to prove particular sales, are 
you? Counsel for Plaintiff: Yes, sir." The court 
stated: ~~That is not admissible under the rule 
on direct examination''---and observed that such 
things may be inquired about on cross-examina-
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tion, and then on redirect, but not on the direct 
examination. ''Counsel: Do I understand the 
court to rule, then, that the witness on direct 
examination cannot give his statement of par-
ticular values of similar property? Court: Yes; 
that is the uniform practice." This ruling is com-
plained of. As stated in 1 Elliott, Ev., sect~on 
180, Jones, Ev. ( 2d Ed.), section 16 8, and 13 
Ency. Ev., pp. 457-463, there is a marked conflict 
of opinion as to the competency of evidence on di-
rect examination to show the sale price of other 
lands of general similarity in location, character, 
and adaptability to use of the lands sold with 
those the value of which is in question, and of 
sales made about the time the value of the latter 
must be established. The cases supporting the 
affirmative and those the negative of the propo-
sition are there noted. Even though the conclu-
sion should be reached that such sales may prop-
erly be shown on the direct examination, yet we 
are clear 1 y of the opinion that in this instance the 
pl~intiff was not harmed by the ruling. The 
witness .had already stated that he had bought 
and sold lands; that he knew of sales of lands 
similar to that of the defendant; that he knew 
the market value of such lands and the market 
value of the defendant's land, and stated what 
that was, and the amount which in his opinion 
the value of the defendant's land was depreciated 
by reason of the construction of the power line 
over it. In such case the plaintiff was not preju-
diced even though it be assumed that it, on the 
direct examination of the witness, was entitled to 
show sales of other lands. (Seattle ~ M. Ry. Co. 
v. Gilchrist, 4 Wash. 509, 30 Pac. 739; Teele v. 
Boston, 165 Mass. 88, 42 N.E. 506; Sargent v. 
Merrimac, 196 Mass. 1711 81 N.E. 970, 11 L. 
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R. A. (N.S.) 996, 124 Am. St. Rep. 528.) At 
any rate, it is not such an error, if there be one, 
as requires a reversal of the judgment." 
In the case at bar the expert witnesses had all tes-
tified that they had bought and sold lands, that they 
knew of the sales of numerous subdivisions in and 
about Salt Lake City; that they knew the market 
value of such lands and of appellants' land the value 
of which they gave, just as witnesses testified in the 
Telluride-Bruneau case. 
If the refusal to admit evidence of the value of 
other lands was not prejudicial error in the Tellu-
ride-Bruneau case, why should it be prejudicial here? 
Were we not justified and was the trial court not jus-
tified in relying upon the former ruling of this court 
that such evidence might be excluded without preju-
dice? Are we to be obliged to re-try this case for an 
error which this court in its former decision declared 
was not an error? We again respectfully request this 
court to reconsider its decision and to recognize the 
rule that it has itself announced and to also consider 
the cases cited in our brief which apply not only to 
acreage tracts, but to subdivision lots as well. (Re-
spondent's Brief, pages 24-28.) 
The Supreme Court of Oregon gives a very cogent 
reason why evidence of the sale price of other lands 
is not admissible: 
"Over the objection of the plaintiff, 'the 
court received in evidence the testimony of the 
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witness, B. A. Kliks, an owner of land in the vi-
cinity of the land being condemned, that a real 
estate man had made him an offer of $1,600.00 
for an acre and a half of his land. The ruling 
is assigned as error. The assignment must be 
sustained. It is well settled in this and other 
jurisdictions that offers of sale and purchase of 
similar land in the vicinity are inadmissible, for 
the reason, among others, that such evidence 
places before the court or the jury an absent per-
son's declaration or opinion as to value, while 
depriving the adverse party of the benefit of cross-
examination. Portland ~ 0. C. Ry. v. Ladd 
Estate Co. 79 or 517, 155 P. 1192; Hine v. Man-
hattan R. Co. 132 N.Y. 477, 30 N.E. 985, 15 
L. R. A. 591; Davis v. Charles River Branch 
. Railroad Co. 65 Cush, Mass. 506; Helena Power 
Transmission Co. v. McLean, 38 Mont. 388, 99 
P. 1061; Blincoe v. Choctaw, 0. ~ W. R. Co. 
16 Okla. 286, 83 Pac. 903, 4. L. R. A. N.S. 890, 
8 Ann Cas. 689; 18 Am. Jur., Eminent Domain 
996, Para. 351; 2 Lewis on Eminent Domain, 
1146, Para. 666. Defendants' counsel do not 
question the rule, but they seek to justify intro-
duction of the otherwise incompetent evidence be-
cause of certain testimony concerning Mr. Kliks' 
property given by one of the witnesses for the 
plaintiff. This evidence, however, was brought 
out on cross-examination of the plaintiff's wit-
ness; and, in any event, nothing that he or any 
other witness testified to warranted or excused 
violation of the rule of evidence in question." 
State v. Cerruti (Ore.) 214 Pac. (2) 346. 
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STRIKING OUT ALLEGATIONS· IN __ _ 
APPELLANTSt ANSWER AS To· 
SEVERANCE DAMAGES 
· There w~s no pre j.udi~ial e~ror iri striking these 
allegations if appellants might have offered evidence 
of such. damage with the stricken allegations omitted. 
It· is clearly pointed out in our brief at pages 35-36 
that under the allegations of the complaint and ap-
pellants' denial in their answer, ptoof of severance 
damage might have been offered. In th¢ complaint it 
is alleged: 
"1 0. That each of the parcels or tracts 
sought to be condemned :as hereinabove referred 
to and set forth is the whole of an entire parcel 
or tract of property or interest in or to property 
owned by the aforesaid defendants." (R. 19.) 
In their answer, appellants denied this allegation 
and prayed for severance damages in the sum of $14,-
000.00. Appellants elected to make no proof disput-
ing the allegation that the property sought to be con-
demned "is the whole of an entire parcel or tract," 
and in their answer they gave no description of other 
land not taken, claimed to have been damaged by seg-
regation. Furthermore, they offered no proof that 
they had other lands that were severeC;l from the con-
demned area nor did they offer to prove that they were 
damaged. 
It was not prejudicial error to strike the alle·ga-
tions with reference to severance damages for the ad-
ditional reason that if appellants were obliged to file 
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any answer (see 18 American Jurisprudence, page 970, 
Section 326), there was no requirement that their an-
swer contained more than a mere appearance. Our 
statute, Section 78-34-7, provides: 
"All persons in occupation of or having or 
claiming an interest in any of the pro.perty de-
scribed in the complaint or in the damages for 
the taking thereof, though not named, may ap-
p·ear, plead and defend, if in respect to his own 
property or interest or that claimed by him, in 
the same manner as if named in the complaint.'' 
(Italics ours.) 
The Supreme Court of Montana, construing an 
identical statute, said: 
"The only effect of a default is to shut out 
the defendants from participating in the proceed-
ings. The court must nevertheless determine 
whether the use for which the property is sought 
to be appropriated is a public use, limit the amount 
taken to the necessities of the case and ascertain 
the damages .under the procedure and in accord-
ance with the standard provided for in Sections 
2220, 2221 and 2224. 
* * * * 
"But counsel says .that defendants' claims 
for damages should have been set up in their an-
swers by way of counterclaim, thus giving plain-
tiff notice of their character and amount so that 
it could be prepared to meet them. The ans\ver 
to this contention is that there is no provision in 
the title touching condemnation proceedings, re-
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quiring defendants to set up their claims for dam-
ages in their pleadings in any form.'' 
The damages must of necessity be ascertained 
because under the Constitution of this State, provid-
ing that property may not be taken for public use 
without just compensation, the court must at all events 
determine what is "just compensation." In the same 
-case, the Montana court uses this language: 
''Objection was made to certain evidence 
tending to show damage to portions of defend-
ants' lands not actually traversed by the railroad 
and not described in the petition. It is said now 
that the claims for damages in this behalf should 
have been specially pleaded, and plaintiff cites sev-
eral Illinois cases in support of this contention, 
among them: Stetson v. C. ~ E. R. Co., 75 Ill. 
7 4; Chicago ~ I. R. Co. v. Hopkins, 90 Ill. 316; 
Johnson v. Freeport ~ M. R. Co., Ill Ill. 413. 
It will be seen on examination of these cases, how-
ever, that the Illinois statute permits the defend-
ant in such cases to file a cross-petition in order 
to set forth more fully and accurately his 
claim. But our statute contains no such pro-
vision. Besides, as we have seen, the lands of the 
different defendants in this case are all compact 
bodies, and it is clearly within the purview of 
the court's duty to ascertain what damages have 
accrued, not only as to the part described in the 
complaint, but also to the whole of the body, a 
part of which only is taken. Such damages are 
not special in the proper meaning of that term." 
Yellowstone Park R. Co. v. Bridger Coal 
Co., 87 Pac. 963-966. 
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How then can it be said that the court commit-
ted error in striking out allegations 'vhich appellants 
were never under any necessity to set forth in their an-
swer? 
We respectfully submit that the court's decision 
is entirely erroneous in holding: 
(a) That the water system should have 
been valued separately; 
(b) That evidence should have been re-
ceived of the value of similar lands, 
·and 
(c) That appellants were prejudiced by the 
striking out of the allegations in their 
amended answer with reference to sev~ 
erance damages. 
We cannot think that this court upon further 
reflection will desire this decision to stand. Further-
more, appellants were never really dissatisfied with the 
award of the jury. What they wanted was interest 
from the date of the service of summons, to which 
- . -
this court very properly holds they were not entitled. 
In proof of the fact that appellants 'vere satisfied 
except as to the matter of interest, the court will find 
at pages 21 and 22 of appellants' brief the following: 
HA New Trial Is Not Required. 
''Ma thematically, the interest on the fair 
market value of the defendants' property between 
the ,date of the injury and the time when the 
amount of the award was determined can readily 
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be computed. At six per cent it amounts to 
$24,799.32 for the period July 12, 1951 until 
. May 10, 1952. 
"This amount the court below could and 
should have included in the judgment on the 
verdict, no jury question bein-g involved. St. 
Louis, etc., Ry. Co. v. Oliver (Okla.), 87 P. 423t 
2 Lewis on Eminent Domain, S. 742, at page 
1324. 
"This error can be corrected by simple di-
rection of this court, no new trial or resubmission 
to the jury being required.'' 
Why should this court put the parties to the 
great e·xpense of a protracted retrial when appellants 
themselves say that it is not necessary and that all they 
ask is a computation of interest and when, as we have 
shown in the preceding pages of this argument, no 
prejudicial error was committed? 
We respectfully submit that a rehearing should 
be granted for the correction of the manifest errors in 
the court's decision. 
E. R. CALLISTER, JR., 
Attorney General 
JESSER. S. BUDGE, 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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